Practice Management Contracts: State of the Law by Borsody, Robert P.
City University of New York Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 1
Summer 2003
Practice Management Contracts: State of the Law
Robert P. Borsody
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more information please contact
cunylr@law.cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert P. Borsody, Practice Management Contracts: State of the Law, 6 N.Y. City L. Rev. 11 (2003).
Available at: 10.31641/clr060102
PRACTICE MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS:
STATE OF THE LAW
Robert P. Borsody*
Management contracts are widely used to create a business re-
lationship between a professional practice, usually a medical prac-
tice, and a practice management entity.  Businessmen often want to
“partner” with, or at least profit from, medical practices.  Medical
professionals, on the other hand, find themselves burdened with
compliance requirements that are mandated by regulatory bodies
at all levels.  Such demands include billing changes, documenta-
tion and patient confidentiality requirements, and the increasing
need to compete in a managed care environment, where payers
compress fees while paperwork increases.  At the same time, “mira-
cles of modern medicine” are constantly being produced.  From
the latest drug to the latest medical instrument, device or proce-
dure, doctors are expected to keep current on information in their
field.  Patients demand it; if it is not provided, these patients can
become plaintiffs in malpractice actions.
It is not surprising, therefore, that practice management com-
panies with their promise of relieving doctors from all but the
clinical responsibilities of the medical practice have proliferated.
There have been a number of large, publicly traded practice man-
agement companies such as Phycor and Medpartners, but there
are many small management companies that provide services to as
few as one medical practice.  All have one thing in common: a con-
tractual relationship between the medical practice and the man-
agement company which describes and delineates the business and
legal relationship.
Management companies and their associated contracts are
only needed in those states where the prohibition on the corporate
practice of a profession do not allow a medical practice to be di-
rectly owned by anyone other than medical doctors.  Several states
allow a professional practice to be owned by an ordinary business
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health law research and test case litigation. Earlier he was affiliated with the New York
firm of Sullivan & Cromwell. He chaired the Public Health Committee of New York
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corporation that, in turn, may be owned by laypersons.1  A few ad-
ditional states allow limited liability corporations to practice
medicine and to be owned by laymen.  New York clearly upholds
and enforces the prohibition against corporate practice of
medicine,2 as does New Jersey.3  This article will survey recent deci-
sions in both states that have dealt with the conflicting issues sur-
rounding management contracts and professional practices.
Lawyers, in crafting the contractual relationship between busi-
nesses and medical practices in both New York and New Jersey,
seek to afford maximum protection to the practice management
company, if that is their client, to ensure that the company will not
lose the benefit of its time, expertise and investment expended on
behalf of the medical practice.  However, such a contractual rela-
tionship cannot exert excessive control over the professional prac-
tice or the relationship will trespass into the forbidden area of
corporate practice of medicine.  There has been paucity of case law
in this area up until now and very little in the way of other legal
guidelines.  Recently in the last few years, however, decisions in this
area of law have been handed down more frequently, including
several agency rulings.  The exploration of the conflict between
medical and management contracts begins with an analysis of Rul-
ing Letters from governmental agencies.
THE RULING LETTERS
While ruling letters are useful since they are expressions of
opinion on the state of the law from government agencies that may
be charged with enforcement of those laws, they are often limited,
by their terms, to the specific state of facts presented or even to the
specific person presenting the facts.  Nonetheless, in an area with
few legal beacons, even faint gleams are welcome.
On April 15, 1998, the Office of the Inspector General of the
1 See generally, Sara D. Mars, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Call for Action, 7
HEALTH MATRIX 241 (1997); Judith Parker, Corporate Practice of Medicine: Last Stand or
Final Downfall? 29 J. HEALTH & HOSP. LAW 160 (1996); Patricia F. Jacobson, Prohibition
Against Corporate Practice of Medicine: Dinosaur or Dynamic Doctrine?, 1993 HEALTH LAW
HANDBOOK 67; Arnold J. Rosoff, The Business of Medicine: Problems with the Corporate
Practice Doctrine, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 485 (1987); Alanson W. Wilcox, Hospitals and the
Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 432 (1960); Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry,
40 VANDERBILT L. REV 445 (1987); John Wiorek, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doc-
trine, An Outmoded Theory in Need of Modification, 8 J. LEGAL MEDICINE 465 (1987).
2 Francis J. Serbaroli, Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Clear and Present Danger,
N.Y.L.J. Sept. 23, 1993 at 3.
3 Sara D. Mars, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Call for Action, 7 HEALTH MA-
TRIX 241, 292 (1997).
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United States Department of Health and Human Services issued
one of its opinions.4  The ruling stated that if a management com-
pany provides services to a medical practice and the compensation
of the management company was determined as a percentage of
the gross or net revenues of the medical practice, then this type of
contract would not be “safe harbored” under the federal laws.5
This theory is based on the notion that if the management
company’s responsibilities included, in any way, production of pa-
tients through, for example, advertising, public relations or even
negotiation of managed care contracts, then the management
company would have an incentive to increase the number of pa-
tients in order to increase its compensation.  This would be the
case because, the management company would receive a percent-
age of the revenue of the medical practice that would increase with
the number of patients.  As a result, the management company
would have an incentive to increase the number of patients to in-
crease its revenue.  This reasoning is similar to the basic premise of
the Federal Self-Referral Statue.6  This prohibition bars referral of
patients by a physician to a business with which the physician has a
financial relationship.  This is because the physician will derive in-
come from his ownership interest and will, in theory, have an in-
centive to referrer patients to the business to increase his own
financial security.
Some of these ruling letters have expressed opinions as to the
permissible parameters of management contracts.  In an April 17,
1997 ruling letter by General Counsel Henry M. Greenberg,7 a hy-
pothetical posed the legality of payments by physician’s profes-
sional corporations to management companies that would receive
a per visit fee for each visit made to the P.C.  The management
company would be paid a fee at the end of each month deter-
mined by multiplying the fixed fee times the number of patient
visits in that month.  The management company would also be re-
sponsible for marketing and other management activities for the
P.C.
4 Opinion No. 98-4 from the Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services (April 15, 1998).
5 Id.
6 42 U.S.C.A. § 1128 (b).
7 The opinion letters of the Office of Counsel General of the New York State
Department of Health are not compiled or published in any generally available form,
hence, there is no uniform system of citation.  Efforts are underway to induce the
Department to make them available on the Internet with an accompanying search
engine.
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The Office of Counsel disapproved of this method of compen-
sation for similar reasons stated in the federal ruling letter; if the
management company is providing the patients, the management
company cannot be paid on a per patient basis.8
Another New York State opinion dated May 2, 1995 by Jerry
Jasinski, Acting General Counsel, disapproved of a management
contract relationship where the management company proposed
to provide a broad spectrum of services including office space, all
necessary equipment, and all non-clinical services.  Referring to an
earlier June 13, 1994 opinion, the proposed arrangement was
viewed as an “establishment of a de facto diagnostic and treatment
center.  Control of the facility apparently rests primarily with the
business corporation rather than with the professional corpora-
tion.”  The corporate practice prohibition was not mentioned or
discussed, however, a basis for disapproval was the operation of an
unlicensed diagnostic and treatment center.
A business corporation may be licensed under Article 28 of
the New York Public Health Law to operate a diagnostic treatment
center that may employ medical personnel and practice medicine
and is, therefore, an exception to the prohibition against corporate
practice.  In this May 2, 1995 opinion letter, the New York State
Department of Health could, therefore, be viewed as taking the
position that provision of the above-described broad spectrum of
responsibilities by a management company, leaving a practice with
solely clinical responsibilities, raises significant corporate practice
issues.
While letter rulings on both the state and federal level, as
mentioned, can serve as useful guides, they are simply the opinions
of lawyers; albeit lawyers charged with enforcing the laws about
which they are issuing opinions.  The more definitive and positive
pronouncement of the law is, of course, the common law interpre-
tation of decided cases.
THE CLASSIC CASES
Until recently, there had been only two cases that arose out of
management contracts for medical services rendered.  The first is a
Texas case, Flynn Brothers Inc. v. First Medical Associates and the sec-
ond is a New Jersey case, Women’s Medical Center v. Finley.
8 Note that an earlier ruling letter dated February 3, 1993 by Peter I. Millock
rendered to a New York State Department of Services, p. 2 paragraph 2, specifically
provided that a “click fee” compensation provision by a medical practice to a provider
of radiology equipment was permissible as a form of per use leasing.
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1. THE FLYNN BROTHERS v. FIRST MEDICAL ASSOCIATES
Flynn Brothers, Inc. v. First Medical Associates,9 was a proceeding
brought by the Flynn brothers, owners of a management company,
against First Medical Associates, a medical practice, for monies due
for provided management services.  The medical practice de-
fended against the claim on the ground that the management con-
tract was unenforceable because it was legally defective.  The legal
defect was alleged to be a percentage compensation provision in
the contract which provided that the Flynn brothers would be paid
two-thirds of medical practice’s gross revenues.
The Texas Court of Appeals agreed that the percentage com-
pensation provision was a fatal defect because it violated the Texas
Medical Practice Act , Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 4495 (b), against
fee splitting between a professional and a non-professional.100
Since the contract contained this fatal defect, the Flynn brothers
were unable to collect fees for provided services.  The Appellate
Court held that the fee splitting provisions and other broad con-
tractual rights granted by the professional corporation to the man-
agement company “indirectly allowed [the Flynn brothers] to
provide medicine without a license.”111  This case sheds little light
on the management contract phenomenon.
2. WOMEN’S MEDICAL CENTER v. FINLEY
Women’s Medical Center v. Finley,122 was an appeal from a New
Jersey Department of Health decision that reversed the finding of
an administrative law judge.  The administrative law judge had
found that the appellants, three gynecological practices specializ-
ing in first trimester abortion services, were not required to be li-
censed and regulated under the New Jersey Health Care Facilities
Planning Act, N.J.S.A. 26:2H-1, et. seq., but were, rather, private
practices as defined under N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2(b).  The New Jersey
Health Commissioner, Joanne Finley, argued that the appellants
were not private practices but, rather, “health care facilities” within
the meaning of the New Jersey Health Care Facilities Planning Act
because they had each contracted with a management company for
the provision of a “full range of non-professional office manage-
ment services”.13
9 715 S.W. 2d 782 (Tex. App., 1986)
10 Id. at 783.
11 Id. at 785.
12 469 A.2d 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983, cert. denied, 475 A.2d 578 (1984).
13 Id. at 67.
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The Appellate Division extensively analyzed and quoted the
language in the management contract, noting that the language
specifically reserved to the medical practice the right to exclusive
control over all clinical aspects and patient relationships while
carefully limiting the management company to business and finan-
cial aspects only.  The court then ruled that the contract properly
preserved the respective rights and duties of the parties, limiting
the medical practice to the medical area and the management
company to the business area.
It is noteworthy that the Court approved of the structure and
the content of the management contracts although it noted that
“patient fees are paid to [the management company] and depos-
ited to its account.  Only it has the authority to draw on that ac-
count.  It pays all expenses and issues weekly checks to the
physicians, providing them with year-end 1099 forms.”14  It was fur-
ther noted that all the office equipment was owned by the manage-
ment companies which also leased the premises to the physicians
who, it was noted, had made no capital investment in the office.
Supportive of the concept of management contracts generally,
the Court disagreed with the Commissioner’s argument that a
management company might exercise excessive pressure on a man-
aged medical practice “by encouraging the physicians to provide
medical care which is unnecessary or too speedily delivered.”15
The Court countered that argument stating, “those physicians who
need to recoup their office capitalization costs and who may be
operating their offices on a less economically efficient basis be-
cause of their direct and time-consuming involvement in non-pro-
fessional office management details might have an even greater
incentive to insure the gross profitability of their practices.”16
Although this seminal management contract case appears to
provide clear cut guidelines for management company relation-
ships with physician practices, there are two major considerations
which militate against its utility.  The first is that the Court did not
consider the legal question of whether the nature of the relation-
ship was consistent with corporate practice prohibition principles
but, rather, whether the professional practice was required to be
regulated as a health care facility under the State Certificate of
Need laws by virtue of its relationship with a management
company.
14 Id. at 69.
15 Id. at 73.
16 Id. at 74, n. 1.
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The second major distorting factor, which is noted in the Ap-
pellate Division opinion, is that the Commissioner’s attempt to ex-
ert regulatory control over the practices may have been caused by
“the nature of the medical services rendered by these practices”.17
The Court went on to observe in the footnote that the Commis-
sioner had in the past expressed “special administrative concern
for first trimester abortions” and had attempted to impose exten-
sive regulations over such procedures which were later deemed
unconstitutional.18
For many years, these cases were the only guidelines for law-
yers seeking to draft contracts describing the relationship between
a practice management company and a medical practice.  There
are now a number of cases providing a great deal more guidance;
unfortunately, some of the cases are conflicting.
THE CURRENT CASES
Few of the current cases actually discuss permissible (or imper-
missible) phrases or wording in management contracts, as was the
case in Women’s Medical Center v. Finley.  The cases do, however, dis-
cuss other permissible parameters of the relationship between a
business entity and a medical entity including other corporate
mechanisms that are used to protect the investment and business
relationship of the management company with the medical
practice.
THE NEW JERSEY CASES
The New Jersey cases were decided first and, although they
deal with similar subject matter, they were not cited as precedent
by the New York courts.  Indeed, they were distinguished by a later
New York case.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Schick, et al.19  was an action brought against
numerous defendants including businessmen and their manage-
ment companies, medical professional corporations and the medi-
cal doctors who owned them, as well as chiropractors who worked
for the medical PCs and some of whom also owned the manage-
ment companies.  The plaintiff insurance company sought to en-
join all arbitrations, pending and future, brought by the defendant
professional corporations and the disgorgement of some
$14,200,000 already paid to the defendants plus treble damages
17 Id. at 74.
18 Id. at 74, n. 2.
19 Schick, 328 N.J. Super. 611, 746 A.2d 546 (1999).
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under the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act.20
Plaintiff charged that defendants created a series of sham pro-
fessional corporations that appeared to be owned by New Jersey
licensed physicians but were actually controlled by defendant man-
agement companies through management contracts and other cor-
porate devices.  The corporate control devices alleged and attacked
by plaintiffs included the fact that the medical doctor owners of
the professional corporations did not work in the professional cor-
porations and resided outside the state (although licensed in New
Jersey).  Further, these doctors signed “undated resignation letters
and undated stock assignment agreements. . ..”21
The Court found that these devices, along with the manage-
ment contract, allowed defendant management companies to exer-
cise unacceptable amounts of control over defendant professional
corporations.
Defendants argued that if services were reasonable, necessary
and performed by a plenary licensed physician, then the insurance
company plaintiffs should, nonetheless, be required to make pay-
ment under the New Jersey No-Fault Law despite any finding that
the corporate structure was defective.
Judge Villanueva held, however, that in order to be eligible for
payment, a provider must comply with other elements of the state
law.22  The court said that in order for a provider to be eligible for
payment, medical services rendered, in addition to being reasona-
ble and necessary, “must conform with pertinent norms as a pre-
condition for eligibility under the Act” and that an insurer may
deny benefits “based upon a health care provider’s failure to com-
ply with the administrative regulations governing the practice of
healthcare in the State.”23  The failure of a medical provider or
service to adhere to the regulation requiring; ownership by a physi-
cian with a plenary license, interpretation of test results by such a
physician; and compliance with any other significant state statute
or agency regulation, renders that provider ineligible for reim-
bursement under the No-Fault Act.24
20 N.J. STAT. ANN. §17:33 A-5 (1983).
21 Schick, 328 N.J. Super. At 617, 746 A.2d at 549.
22 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orthopedic Evaluations, Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 510, 693
A.2d 500 (App. Div. 1997), cert. granted, 697 A.2d 541 (1997), aff’d, 700 A.2d 372
(1997); Thermographic Diagnostics, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 768 (N.J. 1991),
125 N.J. 491; Prudential Prop. & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Midlantic Motion X-Ray, Inc., 737
A.2d 711, 325 N.J. 54 (N.J. Super. L. 1999).
23 Id. at 620.
24 N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, §35:2.5 (1997). It sets forth three distinct elements
that a medical screening or medical diagnostic testing facility must satisfy. The prac-
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The defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied
because the court found evidence that raised factual issues to sup-
port the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants may have created
sham medical corporations that appeared to be owned by plenary
licensed physicians.  The defendants, through management con-
tracts, apparently controlled these corporations, in an attempt to
circumvent administrative prohibitions against plenary licensed
physicians from being employed by chiropractors.25  As a lens on
the law of management contracts in New Jersey, the Schick case is
clouded by the claims of impropriety against the defendants.26
Nevertheless, the decision clearly holds that where there has been
a finding of excessive control by a non-licensed entity over a li-
censed entity, an insurer is excused from any legal responsibility to
pay claims to the licensed entity.
In the second New Jersey case, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northfield Med-
ical Center27, allegations of excessive control by a management com-
pany over a medical practice came before Judge Villanueva once
again.  Two motions for summary judgment made in this case were
both denied based on findings of fact and conclusions of law simi-
lar to Schick.
On the motion to dismiss, the court, in Northfield, addressed
the detailed wording of the contractual relationship between the
management company and the medical practice, which it found
defective under New Jersey law.  The Court found the lease be-
tween the management company and the medical practice, which
did not allow termination by the medical practice but provided for
automatic yearly renewal at the discretion of the management com-
pany, evidence of “sham ownership” of the medical P.C.
Further, the court found that the management services con-
tract was defective where the management company solely calcu-
lated compensation and there was no termination option for the
medical practice.  Furthermore, Judge Villanueva noted that the
owner of the medical practice lacked signature authority over the
tice “shall be owned and under the responsibility of one or more physicians each of
whom holds a plenary license from the State Board of Examiners; the testing shall be
performed under the authority of a designated responsible physician who shall estab-
lish a protocol and a quality assurance program and the results shall be interpreted by
a physician holding a plenary license in the state.
25 Schick, 328 N.J. Super. at 629.
26 Id. at 614, n.1. “. . .[A]gents from New Jersey’s Office of Insurance Fraud Prose-
cutor (“OIFP”) raided the facilities of six of the defendant chiropractic and rehabilita-
tion facilities. . .[and]also arrested several individuals alleging that they were part of a
fund ring conspiring to defraud the insurance industry.”
27 No. MRS-L3228-99 (N.J. Sup. Ct, Morris Co.) (filed on Oct. 18, 1999).
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bank account of the medical practice, which alone was sufficient to
defeat the motion of the management company to dismiss the ac-
tion.28  Moreover, the owners of the professional corporation,
which owned the medical practice, did not invest any money or
make any capital contribution.  Comparing Northfield to Women’s
Medical Center v. Finley case is tempting, but the passage of time and
changed political and social contexts are more significant.29  More
striking is the contrast with the recent New York Federal Court de-
cisions discussed below.  Before reviewing these cases, however,
some background in the relevant New York case law would be
useful.
THE NEW YORK CASES
Although management contracts for medical practices have
been used in New York State for many years, only recently have
they been litigated.  The oldest case on record is Necula v. Glass.30
This appeal involved a doctor who had been excluded from the
Medicaid program after a hearing before the State Department of
Social Services.  The hearing officer determined that the doctor
had engaged in illegal fee splitting because the contracts the doc-
tor had entered into with management companies, under which
the companies were to provide the doctor with “facilities, supplies,
equipment and non-physician staff necessary to operate his radiol-
ogy practice, and the [doctor] was to pay the companies a fixed
percentage of his receipts for billing services and a fixed dollar
amount for each procedure performed.”31  The Appellate Division
upheld the exclusion on the grounds that the doctor had engaged
in illegal fee splitting since the doctor’s payments to the companies
were a percentage of or otherwise dependent upon his income or
receipts.  The record on appeal included opinion letters from the
28 Finley, supra note 12, at 69; see also supra note 14, infra text at 306.
29 See Material Damage Adjustment Corp. v. Open MRI of Fairview, 799 A.2d 731
(N.J. Super. L. 2002). In this case, summary judgment was granted to plaintiff insurer
for all fees paid to defendant MRI facility on the ground that the defendant was not
properly licensed according to the State regulatory requirements for an MRI facility
when the fees were paid.  The court cited and relied upon the same case, Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Orthopedic Evaluations, Inc. (see infra n. 22), as Judge Villanueva in the Northfield
case and for the same principle: that failure to comply with regulations disqualifies a
provider from receiving insurance payments.  There was no management contract in
the Material Damage Adjustment Corp. case.  The defendant was a business corporation
owned by two non-licensed persons. (see slip. op. at 21)  There was no discussion of
any corporate practice violations arising out of non-licensed persons acquiring a cor-
poration that provided medical services and had no license.
30 Necula, 647 N.Y.S. 2d 501 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1996), 231 A.D. 2d 457.
31 Id. at 501.
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New York State Department of Health, Office of the Counsel which
included those discussed above.  The letters expressed disapproval
of the percentage compensation arrangement for a management
contract but did not express disapproval of the per use fee
approach.
The next case to be decided involving management market
contracts was an unreported Supreme Court decision in Nassau
County, State Farm Insurance Co. v. Medical Health Office of Stony
Brook, P.C.32  This case involved the denial of an application by the
insurance company petitioner to stay arbitration of certain bills
submitted by respondent on the grounds that the P.C. was illegally
controlled by a management company.  The defects alleged by the
petitioner insurance company included the fact that a chiroprac-
tor, who was a shareholder of the management company, was the
secretary of the respondent professional corporation.  This allega-
tion was dismissed by the court with reference to section 1501(e) of
the New York Business Corporation Law, which says that the term
“officer” does not include the secretary of a corporation having
only one shareholder.33  The court further found that the fact that
the management company “has utilized the address of [the profes-
sional corporation] and it possesses a security interest in the [pro-
fessional corporation’s] accounts receivable does not reflect
ownership or transfer of ownership.  Rather, it reflects, as [the pro-
fessional corporation] urges and supports by evidence, that [the
management company] provides management services for [the
professional corporation] with respect to matters other than medi-
cal care, such as hiring non-medical personnel and maintaining
and providing equipment.”34
The next case is Martone v. Healthsouth Holdings, Inc.,35 which
involved a management company that was owned by Healthsouth,
but managed by a professional corporation owned by Martone, a
physical therapist.  Healthsouth had contracted to purchase the
plaintiff’s practice and employ her as a physical therapist.  While
Healthsouth exercised significant control over her practice,
Martone was listed as an employee of another physical therapist in
another office, who was unaware of this arrangement.  Healthsouth
as it operates in other states, where ordinary business corporations
32 State Farm Ins. Co., Index No. 007828/99 by Judge Burton Joseph (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Nassau Co., May 10, 1999).
33 N. Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1501 (e) (McKinney).
34 State Farm Ins. Co., Index No. 007828/99 at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.  Nassau Co., May
10, 1999).
35 222 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1999, at 29 (1A Part 6, ) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 23, 1999).
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may employ physical therapists, may have mistakenly thought it was
entitled to employ Martone as a physical therapist in New York.
However, this purchase took place after the New York State Office
of the Professions issued an advisory that warned that general busi-
ness corporations were not authorized to provide physical therapy
services in the New York State.  When Martone became aware of
the impropriety of the situation, she resigned and requested that
Healthsouth stop using her provider number on insurance reim-
bursement claims.  The court stated that “HealthSouth may have
falsely represented to the public that it operated a number of phys-
ical therapy offices in the State” despite knowing that it “could not
lawfully provide physical therapy services in the State [and] may
have engaged in a deliberate scheme to avoid that prohibition.”36
In Mainline Medical Services, Inc. et al., v. Thomas Teyibo, et al.,37
the management company sued a medical P.C. it managed for
non-payment of services.  Defendant claimed that the management
company “controlled all primary indicators of ownership; includ-
ing management of money, billing, collection receivables and had
absolute discretion with respect to paying the bills.”38  Therefore,
defendant maintained that the contracts were void and unenforce-
able because they unlawfuly controlled the defendant P.C. and
plaintiff’s claim for compensation should be denied.  However, the
management company argued “arrangements for lay people to
provide financial services to a medical P.C. are both proper and
lawful.”39
Judge Gammerman denied the management company’s mo-
tion for summary judgment because issues of fact were raised as to
whether the medical doctor “actually owned or controlled” the
professional corporation and whether the contracts with the man-
agement company “were a scheme by the [management company]
to and intended to create an appearance of compliance with the
statute.”40
In Fordham Medical and Pain & Treatment, P.C. v. State Farm Mu-
36 Id. at 30. Because Healthsouth acknowledged it knew prior to its purchase of
Martone’s practice of the prohibition on the legality of its services, the court for-
warded a copy of its decision to the Office of the Professions for that office to take
appropriate action. Further, because it appeared that Healthsouth might have en-
gaged in false representation to the public, the court also forwarded a copy of its
decision to the Attorney General for appropriate action to be taken against
Healthsouth.
37 Index No. 602614/00 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., Nov. 20, 2000).
38 Id. at 3-4.
39 Id at 5.
40 Id.
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tual Insurance Company,41 a management company-operated medi-
cal P.C. brought an action for payment for medical services against
State Farm Insurance Company.  Payment had been denied be-
cause State Farm charged that the P.C. was formed and operated in
violation of Article 15 of the New York Business Corporation Law
which governs professional corporations.
State Farm also raised the argument in opposition to plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment.  The court failed to discuss the
management contract arrangement which existed in this case but,
rather, discussed the corporate organization and operation of the
claimant’s business.  The court noted a number of defects in the
organization and operation of the corporation citing certain news-
paper quotes which included statements made by an attorney for
the doctor asserting that the doctor had no authority to write
checks for the P.C. and was “basically an employee” of the P.C.42
The court also noted that the same doctor had been involved in
insurance fraud with another P.C. Subsequently, the court denied
plaintiff’s (P.C.’s) motion for summary judgment noting that the
plaintiff “cannot be allowed to benefit from the fraudulent activity
described. . ..”43
In 2000, a massive lawsuit was filed against over 100 provider
defendants.  The case Progressive Northeastern Insurance Co. v. Ad-
vanced Diagnostic & Treatment Medical, P.C.,44 charged that a group
of physicians had sold the use of their names and licenses to form
sham corporations which were used by certain defendants to de-
fraud plaintiff owners.  Plaintiff owners brought claims under the
State Consumer Protection Law as well as under the RICO stat-
ute.45  The action sought $60,000,000 in damages.
In response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
the trial court dismissed certain claims, including the State Con-
sumer Protection Act claim.  However, the court refused to dismiss
the claims of improper formation of the defendant’s professional
corporations, finding that the Business Corporation Law does not
“[prevent] a plaintiff from challenging the legitimacy of a
corporation.”46
41 Fordam Medical Pain & Treatment, P.C. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Com-
pany, Index No. 600403/00(Judge Marilyn Shafer) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Jan. 11, 2001).
42 Id.at 4.
43 Id.
44 Progressive Northeastern Insurance Co. v. Advanced Diagnostic & Treatment
Medical, Index No. 601112/00 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2001).
45 18 U.S.C. section 1962(d).
46 Id. at 14.
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Judge Gammerman refused to dismiss the complaint in the
Progressive case just as he also refused to grant summary judgment
to the plaintiff in the Mainline Medical Services, Inc. v. Tyebo case.  In
the Progressive case, the decision could be read to mean that proof
of excessive management company control of a managed P.C.
could be sufficient reason to permit an insurance company not to
pay.  The Mainline case is almost the reverse factual situation, and
his decision there could be read to mean that such excessive con-
trol would allow a medical P.C. to avoid having to pay a manage-
ment company for services the management company had
rendered.
The holding of a recent case in this area in the Federal Court
in the Eastern District of New York decided on September 20, 2001
is significantly variant from most of the cases discussed heretofore.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Robert Mallela,47
State Farm sued approximately thirty-six medical practices, the
owners of the medical practices, and various business persons.
Claim was made for the return of some $6,000,000 in payments
made to the practices based on the alleged illegal structure of the
practices.  The motion for summary judgment by defendants
claimed that defendants’ corporations’ “. . . structure does not re-
lieve plaintiff of its obligation to pay for reasonable and necessary
medical treatments provided by licensed professionals and that no
private right of action exists to enforce New York’s corporate form
requirements.”48  The Court agreed with this argument noting “[t]
he prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine is designed
to protect consumers of health services, not insurers who pay for
those services.”49  The Court went on to observe that “plaintiff has
cited, and the Court has discovered, nothing in the legislative his-
tory of the relevant Business Corporation Law provisions that indi-
cates that the legislature intended to create a private right of action
to enforce these provisions”50 and concluded, therefore, that
“plaintiff has no private right of action to enforce New York’s cor-
porate law requirements.”51
47 Mallela, 175 F. Supp. 2d 401 (EDNY 2001).
48 Id. at 413.
49 Id. at 416, citing Adam Freiman, The Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Prac-
tice of Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of Efficiency Into the Modern Health Care Environ-
ment, 47 EMORY L.J. 697 (Spring 1998); E & B Mktg. Enters. Inc. v. Ryan, 209 Ill. App
.3d 626 (App.Ct.1991).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 417, citing Deutsch v. Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York, 573 F.
Supp. 1443 (SDNY 1983).
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The Court also observed “plaintiff was not damaged by its pay-
ment of claims that it was required to pay and which, in any event,
were for reasonable and necessary medical expenses performed by
licensed health professionals for covered persons and arising out of
covered accidents.”52  The Court also noted that New York courts
were reluctant to require a party to return money paid for lack of a
“statutorily required license,” citing IHS Acquisition XV, Inc. v. Kings
Harbor Healthcare Center.53
In IHS Acquisition XV, Inc., a plaintiff sued for fees for services
rendered to the defendant nursing home by licensed physical ther-
apists that were employed by IHS, a business corporation.  In that
case, the Southern District noted “[o]ne area in particular where
courts have been reluctant to give effect to the public policy de-
fense is where a contracting party is not licensed, but where the
individuals performing the work, and the individual supervising
the work are in fact licensed.”54
The court in the State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mallela case
also noted that “[t]he violation at issue here is not evil in itself and
plaintiff plainly seeks to use the P.C. defendants’ violations as a
sword for personal gain in order to recoup payments that it would,
but for the alleged violations of the Business Corporations Law,
indisputably have been required to pay.  Regulatory sanctions that
are available to the [S]tate ‘quite complimentarily and proportion-
ately protect the underlying public policy,’ especially since licensed
healthcare professionals performed all services.”55
In his twenty-two page decision, Judge Sifton analyzed and dis-
tinguished Judge Gammerman’s decision in Progressive Northeastern
Insurance Company v. Advanced Diagnostic and Treatment Medical, P.C.
finding that that decision decided, only two months’ previously, ac-
tually supported this holding.  Judge Sifton quoted from the Pro-
gressive Northeastern decision stating that there the insuror plaintiffs
“‘are not seeking to deny claims as a result of the corporate struc-
ture of the [service providers], rather, plaintiffs seek to recover for
fraudulent claims which plaintiffs allege were facilitated by the ille-
52 State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 175 F.Supp.2d at 419.
53 Id., citing IHS Acquisition XV, Inc. v. Kings Harbor Healthcare Center, No. 98
CIV 7621 (LBS), 1999 WL 223252 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999).
54 IHS Acquisition XV, Inc. at 2.  To the same effect See, Senior Life Management
v. Dowling , 650 N.Y.S. 2d 437, 440 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1996).
55 State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. at 419-20, citing Lloyd Capital Corp. v. Pat
Henchar, Inc., 80 N.Y.2d 124, 129 (1992).
26 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:11
gal corporate structure.’56  The facts in Progressive Northeastern that,
if proved, would render the claims fraudulent were that the service
providers submitted false claims for equipment that was not used
and for services that were not provided.”57
Judge Sifton also distinguished the case of Fordham Medical
Pain and Treatment, P.C. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, dis-
cussed above, noting that “the court, stating only that ‘[o]bviously
[the professional corporation] cannot be allowed to benefit from
the fraudulent activity described’ by the insurer, held that the in-
surer could deny a claim on the basis of the healthcare provider’s
improper ownership and control.  The fraudulent activity de-
scribed by the insurer included, however, billing for unnecessary
services”.58
The two New Jersey cases discussed above, Allstate v. Schick59
and Allstate v. Northfield Medical Center60, were both also distin-
guished “because those decisions do not consider New York’s statu-
tory and regulatory ‘maze’ of a No-Fault scheme”.61
The Mallela case has been followed in part, and distinguished
in part by subsequent federal court cases in New York.  A New York
State Court has also specifically rejected it, and one has followed it.
In the case of Universal Acupuncture Pain Services, P.C. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,62 Judge Scheindlin, writing for the South-
ern District of New York Federal Court, followed the basic legal
principles set out in Judge Sifton’s opinion from the Eastern Dis-
trict Federal Court.  The facts of the case were interestingly differ-
ent.  A licensed acupuncture practitioner incorporated the
plaintiff, Universal Acupuncture Pain Services, P.C.  The person,
who State Farm argued exercised excessive control over the private
corporation, was Dr. Dipak Nandi, a licensed physician in the State
56 Progressive Northeastern, Index No. 6C01112/00, at 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 25,
2001)(emphasis added).
57 Id. at 417.
58 175 F. Supp. at 417, n.12.
59 746 A.2d 543 (1999).
60 No. MRS-L03228-99 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Apr. 27, 2001).
61 Id. There have been a number of arbitration decisions in this area, one of which
is worth mentioning because of its prefiguring of the holding in Judge Sifton’s deci-
sion.  This was a master arbitration decision of November 18, 1998, Med. Health Of-
fice of Stony Brook v. Peerless Ins. Co. (Case No. 17R 970 21235/98). The Master
Arbitrator noted “the arbitrator below, on her own volition, raised the issue of the
proprietary of the corporate structure of the corporation. . ..” The Master Arbitrator
overturned the denial of claim for payment by the provider corporation holding “the
matter may very well be one for the New York State Public Health Department, but
not for a No-Fault arbitrator.”
62 196 F. Supp.2d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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of New York, who later also became licensed to practice acupunc-
ture.  Under New York Business Corporation Law §§1503(b) and
§1503,63 a medical doctor cannot own a private corporation that
practices acupuncture, unless he is also licensed to practice acu-
puncture.  Additionally, State Farm alleged that Dr. Nandi previ-
ously “controlled” several medical professional corporations, which
were incorporated in the name of the same Dr. Mallela who was a
defendant in Judge Sifton’s case.
State Farm denied obligation to pay for acupuncture services
provided by the plaintiff, Universal Acupuncture Pain Services, ar-
guing that Universal had fraudulently obtained “licenses and certif-
icates required under New York Law.”64
Judge Scheindlin commenced her legal analysis with a review
of the substantive New York State law stating that is clearly unset-
tled in this area.65  She found that “several recent decisions of New
York’s lower courts have held that an insurer has no obligation to
pay no fault benefits for services performed by an unlawfully incor-
porated health care provider.”66
The Court then reviewed the relevant federal law and dis-
cussed the Sifton decision as follows:
A recent decision from the Eastern District of New York, how-
ever, held that a PC’s unlawful incorporation is irrelevant to its
eligibility to sue for no fault benefits assigned to it by an insured.
(See State Farm v. Mallela, 175 F.Supp.2d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)).
In that case, State Farm sued several professional corporations
including Urban Medical for a declaratory judgment that “a pro-
fessional corporation that is unlawfully licensed has no standing
to bring a claim for benefits under the No-Fault law.” (Id. at 407-
63 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1503-1503(b)(McKinney 1983).
64 Universal Acupuncture Pain Services, P.C. v.  State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
196 F. Supp.2d 378, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
65 She cited the following recent cases. See, State Farm Ins. Co. v. N. Bronx Med.
P.C., Index No. 117539/01, at p.2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Jan. 17, 2002) (Wetzel, J.), Ex. C-
39 to Appendix to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (“Def.
Opp.”); Millennium Med. Diagnostics v. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., Index No.
44600/00 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. Sept. 14, 2001), Ex. C-34 to Appendix to Def. Opp.;
see also Fordham Med. Pain & Treatment, P.C. v. State Farm, Index No. 600403/00, at
p.3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Jan. 4, 2001), Ex. C-33 to Appendix to Def. Opp. (upholding
use of standing or eligibility defense against unlicensed professional corporation’s
suit for assigned no fault benefits against an insurer); Advanced Care of New York,
Inc. v. John Friscia et al., Index No. 32528/99, at p. 8 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. Feb. 22,
2000) (dismissing action brought by professional corporation for no fault benefits
because the corporation did not refute defendants’ allegation that it was not licensed
to provide physical therapy services under N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6509-A, and therefore “is
not entitled to recover payments under no-fault law”).
66 196 F. Supp. 2d at 385.
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08.)  In reaching its holding, the court reasoned that “the al-
leged fraudulent ownership of the PC Defendants does not af-
fect the question whether plaintiff’s insureds incurred and incur
basic economic loss that plaintiff is required to compensate”.67
Plaintiff, citing the Mallela case as precedent, sought to dismiss
State Farm’s counterclaim for a declaratory judgment for non-pay-
ment for services rendered.  However, the Court denied the mo-
tion, stating:
Subsequently, a New York state court explicitly rejected Mallela,
stating that “[t]his Court chooses not to follow the decision of
Judge Sifton in the [Eastern District], State Farm v. Mallela, [be-
cause] it is in conflict with the established law in the New York
State Courts.” North Bronx, Index No. 117539/01, at p. 2.  Be-
cause Mallela’s holding regarding eligibility is now in conflict
with several state court rulings and a growing number of arbitral
decisions, declaratory judgment would help clarify the rights
and obligations of insurers and professional corporation.
Therefore, defendant has stated a cause of action for declara-
tory relief.68
Following the reasoning in Mallela, however, the Court did dis-
miss a counterclaim seeking damages based on a violation of the
New York State Business Corporation Law.  The Court made a dis-
tinction between prosecution of an alleged cause of action for vio-
lation of statutory requirements, which it said was not supported by
New York substantive law, and use of such a violation as a defense
in an action for payment.
The Southern District Court also followed the Eastern District
in denying a claim for unjust enrichment by the plaintiff, quoting
Judge Cardozo:
‘[T]he law may at times refuse to aid a wrongdoer in getting that
which good conscience permits him to receive[,] it will not for
that reason aid another in taking away from him that which
good conscience entitles him to retain.’ Schank v. Schuchman,
212 N.Y. 352, 359, 106 N.E. 127 (1914).  Universal may not have
been eligible for the benefits in the first place, but good con-
science entitles it to retain the money paid for services ren-
dered.  Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Counterclaim III is
granted.69
67 Ibid.
68 See id. at 386.  Adding to the conflict and confusion in this area, a later New York
Supreme Court case cited Mallela with approval without mentioning the North Bronx
case cited by Judge Scheindlin.  That case, the most recent in this area, is Kerman v.
Deutchsman, N.Y.L.J. April 24, 2003, p. 20, col. 6.
69 See id. at 387-388.
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State Farm had admitted in Paragraph 38 of its counterclaim
that “acupuncturists, all of whom are either licensed or certified”,
provided all of the acupuncture services.70
Two later Eastern District decisions by Judge Wexler, while not
rejecting the Mallela decision, did not view it as controlling.  The
cases by Judge Wexler were decided only a few days apart and in-
volved the same plaintiff, Great South Bay Medical Care, P.C., but
different defendants.
In the first case, Great South Bay Med. Care, P.C. v. Allstate Ins.
Co.,71 the defendant asserted that the federal court should abstain
from exercising jurisdiction because “the same issues raised in the
lawsuit are the subjects of pending state court litigation involving
the same parties.”72  The pending state court litigation is Progressive
Northeastern, discussed above pending before Judge Gammerman.
In Great South Bay, the Court analyzed several requirements for ab-
stention and concluded that they had been satisfied because:
Not only is there a complete absence of any federal law in this
case, the state law at issue is novel, unsettled, and currently
winding it’s way through the lower courts of the State of New
York.  The issue of how corporate formation relates to the right
to receive payment is one that is particular to the law of the
State of New York.  The decision by the state courts in this unset-
tled matter is preferable to this court exercising its “best bet” as
to how New York law should be interpreted.73
Judge Wexler dealt with the plaintiff’s reliance on the Mallela
case summarily as follow:
Not only is this court not bound by Mallela, the facts therein are
distinguishable from those asserted here.  Here, as in [Progressive
Northeastern], it is alleged that the fraudulent incorporation “fa-
cilitated” fraudulent billing practices.  Denying the particular
defense asserted in Mallela, Judge Sifton commented that no-
where in that action did the insurer allege that non-profession-
als provided services. Mallela, 175 F. Supp. at 407.  Thus, Mallela
stands for the narrow proposition that corporate formation,
standing alone, is not a proper basis for denial of payment.
While this may or may not be the ultimate interpretation of state
law by the courts of that state, its application here would not be
dispositive.
Allstate’s allegations of improper and fraudulent billing
70 See id. at 382.
71 Great South Bay Med. Care v. Allstate Ins., 204 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
72 Id. at 493.
73 Id. at 498.
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here (and in [Progressive] are broader than the allegations of
impropriety set forth in Mallela.  In both actions it is alleged that
[plaintiff] billed at higher medical rates for non-medical ser-
vices and that unnecessary procedures were performed.  Thus,
even if this case remained in this forum, Mallela would in no way
mandate the result sought by [plaintiff].74
It is noteworthy that in Mallela the defendants filed an
amended complaint asserting fraudulent actions by the providers
which was also dismissed by Judge Sifton.75
A few days later Judge Wexler again ruled against the same
plaintiff using virtually the same reasoning and similar language.
In this case, Great South Bay Medical Care, P.C. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co.,76 the court denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss de-
fendant’s counterclaim and distinguished Mallela on the facts
saying:
First, this court is not bound by the decision in Mallela.  Moreo-
ver, State Farm has cited numerous New York State cases and
arbitration decisions with holdings contrary to Mallela, upon
which this court could rely.  Even if this court agreed with the
holding in Mallela, however, the result sought by [plaintiff]
would not necessarily follow.  This is because the facts in Mallela
are distinguishable from those asserted in support of State
Farm’s counterclaim.
State Farm alleges not only that [plaintiff] violated New York
State law when incorporating but also, that this fraudulent in-
corporation was used to facilitate fraudulent billing practices.
74 Id. at 499.
75 Writing a forty-three page opinion, he noted that plaintiffs had not actually al-
leged any new factual allegations of fraud but, instead, only “new legal arguments in
support of plaintiff’s central claim that the ‘previously alleged’ fact that P.C. defend-
ants were actually owned by individuals without licenses justifies plaintiff’s refusal to
pay benefits claims submitted by P.C. defendants” (Slip Op. p. 32).  He noted further
that the violations charged by the plaintiff were not “malum in se” observing that
“Plaintiff has alleged no deficient treatment of patients or submission of charges for
treatment that was unnecessary or not performed and has given the Court no reason
to believe that ownership of P.C. defendants by non-physicians is evil in itself” (Slip
Op. p. 38, N.11).  The Court cited and discussed a federal government ruling by the
Health Care Financing Administration permitting entities “with corporate structures
similar to P.C. defendants to qualify as ‘group practices’”. Ibid.  The Court also noted
that there are many reasons for challenging the license of a professional corporation
including failure to hold an annual meeting or pay licensure renewal fees and, in the
case of individual medical providers, failure to pay child support which, under New
York law, is grounds for revocation of a professional license. Id. at 24.  (C.V. - 00 -
4293) (cps) (November 21, 2002).  A notice of appeal from Judge Sifton’s second
decision has been filed.
76 Great South Bay Medical Care, P.C. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., CV-01-
690 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2002)(Slip Opinion).
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These allegations of fraud along with a broad violation of the
no-fault insurance law, distinguishes this case from Mallela and
states an appropriate claim for relief.  (See, Mallela, 175 F. Supp.
at 407 (noting that insurer nowhere alleged that services were
provided by non-professionals).77
Thus, with the exception of Mallela and Universal Acupuncture,
the cases indicate that while an allegation of improper corporate
structure, standing alone may not suffice as a sword to attack a pro-
vider of services, when pleaded as a device to “facilitate” a fraudu-
lent billing scheme, it will stand at least as a shield to an action by a
provider to recover payment for services.
Judge Gammerman’s latest ruling supports this view in Oxford
Health Plans (N.Y.) Inc. v. Better Care Health Care Pain Management &
Rehab. P.C.78  In denying defendants’ motions to dismiss a large
portion of the plaintiff’s case, the Judge stated:
I have allowed common law fraud claims to proceed where
fraudulent activity has been facilitated by improper corporate
structure.  Plaintiffs here do not seek recovery for the improper
corporate structure alone, but rather maintain that the corpo-
rate structure served as a foundation by which defendants could
readily engage in fraudulent activities.  In Progressive Northeast-
ern Insurance Co. v. Advanced Diagnostics and Treatment Med-
ical, P.C., No. 601112/00 (Sup. Ct., July 25, 2001), I held that an
insurer could raise issues relating to improper corporate form
where the ‘plaintiffs seek to recover for fraudulent claims, which
plaintiffs allege, were facilitated by the illegal corporate
structure.’79
When addressing and subsequently dismissing plaintiff’s argu-
ment based on the two federal court cases (Mallela and Universal
Acupuncture) Judge Gammerman noted that those cases “. . .are in
harmony with my ruling in Progressive. . ..”80  He then quoted Judge
Sifton from Mallela as follows:
Progressive Northeastern, relied on by plaintiff, supports this
court’s holding(. . .)the Progressive Northeastern court stated
that the insurers are not seeking to deny claims as result of the
corporate structure of the [service providers], rather plaintiffs
seek to recover for fraudulent claims, which plaintiffs allege
were facilitated by the illegal corporate structure.81
77 Id. at 7.
78 Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.) Inc. v. Better Care Health Care Pain Management & Rehab.
P.C., N.Y.L.J. 21, (col. 2) (Sept. 19, 2002).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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Furthermore, in discussing and distinguishing Universal Acu-
puncture, Justice Gammerman noted that that federal court had
ruled that there was no cause of action for violation of the General
Business Corporation Law alone, and that:
. . . where damage or injury can be established independent of
the statutory violations, claims relating to improper corporate
structure should not be dismissed.
Here, plaintiffs assert that the improper corporate form uti-
lized by the defendants allowed them to facilitate their various
fraudulent billing schemes.  Plaintiffs may not assert a cause of
action for the violation of Business Corporations Law §§ 1503,
1507, and 1508 alone.  However, plaintiff’s complaint does not
rely on the violation of these provisions as the sole basis for the
fraud and resultant injury claims.  Plaintiff’s complaint alleges
that the improper corporate form utilized by defendants was a
mechanism by which the fraudulent activities could be carried
out and perpetuated.  Plaintiffs seek to recover damages for the
submission of fraudulent claims, not for the alleged statutory vi-
olation.  As such, plaintiffs should not be precluded from basing
portions of their fraud claim on the alleged improper corporate
structure of the defendant corporations.82
Therefore, it appears, at least in the New York State courts,
that pleading (and presumably proving) allegations of fraudulent
billing must accompany claims of defective or faulty corporate
structure in order to prevail.
There have been a number of other cases filed by insurance
companies against healthcare providers claiming recoupment of
payments made and denial of payments pending, based on defects
in corporate structure.  One of them is Allstate Ins. Co., et al. v.
Nandi, et al. 83  While this case makes claims of staged accidents,
payment for referral of patients and other egregious and improper
activity, there were also claims of illegal and improper control over
defendant medical providers “in violation of Article 15 of the Busi-
ness Corporation Law (“BCL”), which governs the corporate prac-
tice of medicine in New York State and requires any corporation
82 Id.
83 Allstate Ins. Co., et al. v. Nandi, et al., S.D.N.Y. 01 CV 5231 (Judge Kimba
Wood). A motion to dismiss is subjudice in this case. See also Valley Physical Med. and
Rehab. v. Allstate Ins. Co., CV99-5697 (LDW) (WDW) (5-16-01 E.D.N.Y.) granting a
discovery motion for documents and information relating to plaintiff’s “licensure and
corporate structure” and N. Bronx Med. P.C. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 105
274/01 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 4-16-01) denying a motion by the P.C. plaintiff to enjoin the
insurance company defendant from challenging the P.C.’s licensing and operating
status as a medical professional corporation in several pending arbitrations brought
by the P.C. against the insurer for payment.
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that provides physician medical services to do so as a professional
corporation (“P.C.”) owned and controlled exclusively by
physicians.84
In addition, in United States v. Orlander an indictment was
brought against a management company, chiropractors, and medi-
cal doctors.85  Although the thrust of the indictment was fraudu-
lent billing, in paragraph 29(a), it was alleged that the chiropractor
converted his practice into a medical practice and through a man-
agement company, he “maintained control over the finances, as-
sets, management, professional and lay personnel, hiring, firing
and the policies governing treatment of patients of the profes-
sional corporation.  Through a series of contractual arrangements
between the newly formed professional corporation and manage-
ment company [the defendants] received all profits from the oper-
ation of [the medical practices].”  The indictment further alleged
that the defendant chiropractor maintained control of the medical
practices through a series of contractual agreements, separate for
each of the facilities, which “gave to the management company the
responsibility of the professional corporation’s day-to-day opera-
tion which funneled all the proceeds of the P.C., with the excep-
tion of payment of the salary of the physicians and certain limited
incidental costs such as malpractice insurance, to the management
companies.”86  This is the first known use of this theory in a crimi-
nal context.  The defendants pled guilty to the fraudulent billing
counts.
CONCLUSION
The form of business operation discussed in these cases is
prevalent throughout the country.  It is a response to the increas-
ing complexity of the health care delivery system and, specifically
to several trends.  Medical doctors for some time have had to be
increasingly concerned with the rapid advance of science and tech-
nology in their particular fields.  While it is a full-time job to pro-
vide patients’ treatment, it is also very time-consuming to read the
medical literature, attend conferences and lectures and simply
keep up with ongoing developments in any specialty.  Increasingly,
doctors are looking for ways to unburden themselves of the busi-
ness aspects of medicine so that they may not only remain doctors,
but also currently competent doctors.
84 See id.
85 United States v. Orlander, No. 01 CR 491 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 29, 2001)
86 Id. Indictment at paragraph 29(q)(Judge Barrington D. Parker, Jr.)
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Unfortunately, concurrent with the above pressing need is the
increasing complexity of the business of medicine.  Managed care,
third party reimbursement, utilization review and concern about
increasing regulation generally, have taken a toll on the practice of
medicine, removing it increasingly to an institutional setting of
hospital’s outpatient departments, HMO clinics, etc. where a large
administrative staff is provided to deal purely with administrative
duties.
The medical practice management company is part of the
widespread trend of doctors, medical groups and other medical en-
tities to engage competent business assistance for dealing with ag-
gressive managed care and insurance companies and the business
aspects of medicine generally.  Moreover, management companies
can allow small practices and even individual practitioners to con-
tinue to exist, offering a more cost-effective option to the health
care consumer, not to mention the ability of the practice to oper-
ate in areas that would otherwise not be medically served.  As indi-
vidual practices are acquired by hospitals and drawn into the orbit
of the major medical empires in the metropolitan area, the con-
sumer has less choice and the choice that exists is far too expen-
sive.  Care in a hospital clinic, for example, is not just incrementally
expensive, but a multiple of what care in a private practice setting
costs.  As one state Board of Medical Examiners noted in 1992:
Physicians have historically practiced medicine individually
or in partnerships or professional corporations wholly owned by
physicians.  In the recent past, however, and particularly in the
last 25 years, alternatives to the traditional model have been cre-
ated or proposed in response to a number of socio-economic
developments in our nation’s health care delivery system.  Affili-
ations between physicians and other components of the health
care system - other health care providers (institutional and indi-
vidual), payors, and other organizations - have been promoted
by some as a means of enhancing the quality and accessibility of
care, reallocating the economic and financial risks of providing
services and decreasing the cost of health care.87
Crafting the relationships between the professionals and the
businessmen is difficult without some kind of legal guidelines.  The
cases discussed above give conflicting signals that, hopefully, will be
harmonized in the near future.
87 LA. STATE BOARD OF MED. EXAMINERS, STATEMENT OF POSITION: EMPLOYMENT OF
PHYSICIAN BY CORPORATION OTHER THAN A PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL CORPORATION
(March 21, 2001).
